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Environmental cost-benefit analysis (ECBA) refers to social evaluation of investment 
projects and policies that involve significant environmental impacts. Valuation of the 
environmental impacts in monetary terms forms one of the critical steps in ECBA. We 
propose a new approach for environmental valuation within ECBA framework that is 
based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) and does not demand any price estimation 
for environmental impacts using traditional revealed or stated preference methods. We 
show that DEA can be modified to the context of CBA by using absolute shadow prices 
instead of traditionally used relative prices. We also discuss how the approach can be 
used for sensitive analysis which is an important part of ECBA. We illustrate the 
application of the DEA approach to ECBA by means of a hypothetical numerical 
example where a household considers investment to a new sport utility vehicle. 
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1. Introduction  
While goods and services exchanged in the market place have readily observable measures of 
their value, the market price, many environmental goods and services such as clean air and water 
resources are generally not valued at all. The absence of markets for environmental services is one 
of the prime examples of the market failure. It is well known that the lack of economic value for 
environmental  goods  generally  leads  to  over-exploitation  and  degradation  of  these  resources. 
Therefore, economic valuation of the environment and its services is one of the most fundamental 
topics in ecological and environmental economics (e.g. Cropper and Oates, 1992; Bingham et al., 
1995, Costanza et al., 1997).  
Standard valuation methods of environmental economics can be classified into two main 
categories: the stated preference (SP) methods and the revealed preference (RP) methods.
1 The 
first  category  includes  techniques  such  as  Contingent  Valuation  Method (CVM)  that  inquires 
people directly about their willingness to pay for environmental goods or willingness to accept 
compensation for reduction in environmental quality, asking the respondents to describe their 
behavior in a hypothetical situation. While there are many different strategies to encourage the 
respondents to state their preferences, all approaches of this category rely on their subjective 
valuation of the environmental issue at hand.
2 The second category rejects the idea of asking 
individuals’ opinions, and instead, tries to infer their willingness to pay indirectly based on the 
observed behavior. Notable examples of the revealed preference approaches include Travel Cost 
Method (TVM) and the hedonic pricing method. While the revealed preference techniques stand 
on a more objective ground, their scope of environmental valuation tends to be more limited. The 
                                                 
1 For a textbook presentation of these methods in environmental valuation, see e.g. Freeman (1993) and Perman et al. 
(2003). 
2 Other stated preference methods include conjoint analysis and contingent behavior. For empirical comparison of 
different stated preferences methods, see e.g. Mackenzie (1993) and Boxall et al. (1996).   3 
revealed  preference  approaches  can  be  applied  in  situations  where  people  already  pay  for  an 
environmental good or service in one way or another, and this payment can be directly observed 
and associated with the use of that particular good or service.  
Environmental  Cost-Benefit  Analysis  (ECBA)  is  one  important  area  where  valuation 
techniques have been used. ECBA refers to social evaluation of investment projects and policies 
that  involve  significant  environmental  impacts.  ECBA  is  widely  applied  by  national 
environmental protection agencies and in many countries the legislation requires ECBA to be 
implemented for all public projects and policies that have significant environmental impacts.
3 Yet, 
many economists and ecologists have pointed out numerous problems, challenges and concerns 
associated with ECBA (see e.g. Dorfman, 1996; Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2002; Ackerman and 
Heinzerling, 2004).  
The economic valuation of the environmental impacts is clearly one of the most heavily 
debated stage of ECBA due to the deficiencies and problems of different valuation techniques.
4 
First of all, as RP techniques are based on observed data from past individual behavior and cannot 
be employed for evaluating environmental non-use (or existence) values such as preserving an 
endangered species, their potential in ECBA has been more limited. Indeed, SP methods have 
been  more  typically  used  for  environmental  valuation  in  ECBA.  On  the  other  hand,  the  SP 
methods have also been heavily criticized because of their hypothetical character; according to 
many critics, the price estimates given by these methods are just hypothetical and do not represent 
actual willingness to pay (see e.g. Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Rosenthal and Nelson, 1992; 
Hausman, 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Cummings et al., 1995). Many critics reject CVM 
                                                 
3 For example, in U.S. Executive Order 13258 requires mandatory environmental cost-benefit analysis for large-scale 
government projects. 
4 See e.g. the lively debate by Frank Ackermann, Kerry Smith and Lisa Heinzerling in American Prospect (May 12, 
2004), http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=7696.   4 
as a valuation method because in their view the results of CVM studies are inconsistent with the 
economic  theory  and  do  not  measure  individual’s  underlying  preferences  (see  e.g.  Hausman, 
1993).  Despite this important critique presented by both economists and ecologists, CVM and 
other  SP  methods  are  extensively  used  in  ECBA,  because  in  many  applications  there  are  no 
alternative methods (see Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006). 
This paper proposes a new alternative approach for environmental valuation within ECBA 
framework  that  is  based  on  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA).  In  addition  to  its  traditional 
confinements in productivity and efficiency analysis, DEA is frequently applied in many other 
areas of applied economic sciences, including agricultural economics, development economics, 
financial economics, public economics, and macroeconomic policy, among others. In the fields of 
ecological  and  environmental  economics,  DEA  has  been  earlier  used  for  environmental 
performance and eco-efficiency analysis (see e.g. Färe et al., 1996; Kortelainen and Kuosmanen, 
2005; Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2005). This paper intends to show that DEA can also be a 
very useful tool for ECBA.  
In its purest form the unique valuation principle of DEA does not depend on either stated 
or revealed preferences. Rather, it turns the value problem other way around, and asks what kind 
of prices would favor this or that particular project or policy alternative. In some situations, DEA 
can provide a clear-cut solution for the ECBA valuation problem without a need to invest in 
costly  RP  or  SP  studies.  Even  if  such  clear-cut  solution  does  not  arise,  a  preliminary  DEA 
assessment can help to structure the problem as well as identify the critical parameters that need 
to be estimated by other methods, which can save a considerable amount of time and money when 
the more demanding RP or SP evaluation studies are implemented.  
Relying on the implicit preferences of the project proponents revealed by the observed 
environmental profiles of the projects, DEA does share some common intellectual roots with the   5 
revealed preference valuation approaches. Thus, the basic DEA approach is likely to appeal those 
who generally prefer the RP approach to SP methods. However, in contrast to the traditional RP 
techniques, the DEA approach proposed in the paper does not require historical, observed data, 
but can equally well be used for evaluating future projects, policies or investments. On the other 
hand, the DEA framework is technically closely related with the Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA), 
which is often mentioned as a “softer” alternative for the more traditional economic techniques. 
Like MCA, DEA approaches the valuation problem from a multi-dimensional perspective, and 
can be applied in combination of MCA or other valuation techniques that incorporate subjective 
judgments and stated preference information to the objective DEA assessment. Thus, DEA offers 
a flexible and general framework that can easily be adapted to the specific features and purposes 
of the ECBA study. 
The practical application of DEA in the ECBA framework presents two major challenges.
5 
First, the purposes of the traditional DEA and ECBA are very different. The traditional DEA is 
geared towards comparative performance assessment of comparable production units performing 
similar  tasks  or  function.  By  contrast,  the  purpose  of  environmental  CBA  is  to  identify  one 
socially  optimal  project  (or  a  basket  of  projects)  to  be  implemented  from  a  set  of  available 
alternatives. Second, the concept of price is different in DEA and ECBA. The traditional DEA 
applies shadow price multipliers that have only a meaning as a relative price, and thus cannot be 
anchored in some currency unit (such as dollar or euro). By contrast, the absolute prices expressed 
in a given currency are necessary for ECBA in order to determine whether any of the alternative 
projects is profitable enough to be implemented.  
                                                 
5 Färe and Primont (1995) and Womer et al. (2006) have earlier suggested the use of DEA in the cost-benefit analysis. 
These  studies  focused  on  other  aspects  of  CBA  and  did  not  pay  particular  attention  on  the  valuation  of  the 
environmental impacts, which forms the main topic of this paper. The adjustments we propose to the standard DEA 
are novel contributions of our paper.   6 
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  show  that  these  two  rather  fundamental 
differences can be reconciled by adjusting DEA for the use as a valuation tool for the ECBA 
framework. Further, because sensitivity analysis is also an important part of ECBA, we describe 
how  DEA  approach  can  provide  useful  information  for  that  purpose.  We  also  illustrate  the 
application of the DEA approach to ECBA by means of a hypothetical numerical example related 
to a household’s investment to a new sport utility vehicle (SUV).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present shortly different 
stages of environmental cost-benefit analysis (ECBA). Section 3 outlines our methodology for 
using DEA to ECBA. Section 4 provides further insight by presenting the dual interpretation for 
our model. Section 5 discusses how DEA approach can be extended to sensitivity analysis. In 
Section 6 we illustrate the proposed methodology by means of numerical example concerning 
investment to a new sport utility vehicle. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Environmental Cost Benefit Analysis (ECBA) 
Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis (ECBA) typically concerns social evaluation of investment 
projects or policies that involve significant environmental impacts, for example, construction of a 
new highway. Depending on the timing of the analysis relative to implementation of project or 
policy, two different types of studies can be separated (Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006). Ex ante 
cost-benefit analysis is conducted before any project or policy is implemented to find optimal 
alternative, whereas ex post cost-benefit analysis is conducted after the implementation of the 
project or policy to examine realized net benefits. In this paper, we focus on the more common ex 
ante analysis, where the purpose is to find the optimal project to be implemented in the future.  
Typical ECBA consists of multiple stages, which usually include:    7 
1) Problem definition (i.e., what are the objectives, what are the alternatives, whose welfare is 
considered, and over what time period),  
2) Identification of the physical impacts of each project (i.e., environmental impact analysis),  
3) Valuation of the impacts,  
4) Discounting of cost and benefit flows,  
5) Selection of the project to be implemented based on the net present value test, and  
6) Sensitivity analysis (i.e., is the result robust to small changes in parameter values).  
 
Typically, the policy or decision makers are responsible for the first stage of the analysis, whereas 
second stage is conducted by experts in ecology, geology, medicine, and other relevant sciences 
(Whitehead and Blomquist, 2006).  Although economists can assist in these first two stages, their 
primary  function  is  usually  in  stages  3)-6).  As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  especially  the 
monetary valuation of environmental impacts in stage 3) is critical for the reliability and success 
of the whole ECBA study. However, also sensitivity analysis (i.e. stage 6)) should have very 
important role in any empirical cost-benefit analysis study, as in that phase one can typically 
account for the effect of changing certain assumptions.   
The main focus of this paper will be on the valuation stage 3), which is usually seen as the 
most critical and difficult part of the analysis. We also consider stages 4)-6) as they are closely 
connected with the valuation stage, but to keep the presentation compact, we abstract from the 
first  two  stages.  For  general  and  detailed  presentations  of  different  stages  and  underlying 
economic theory behind cost-benefit analysis, we refer to the excellent books by Dasgupta and 
Pearce (1985), Johansson (1993) and Boardman et al. (2001).  
 
   8 
3. DEA Approach to ECBA 
Assume the stages 1) and 2) have been completed: the problem has been clearly defined and the 
economic costs and benefits of each project have been estimated. Let the net economic benefit of 
project n in time period t be denoted by Bnt. The net benefit is the difference of economic revenues 
and costs; it has a positive value in the periods where the total revenue exceeds the total cost, and 
a  negative  value  when  the  costs  exceed  revenues.  Suppose  further  that  there  are  M  relevant 
environmental  impacts  that  need  to  be  considered.  We  will  assume  that  the  physical 
environmental impacts can be unambiguously quantified and the impacts of project n in period t 
can be numerically represented by vector Znt = (Z1nt … ZMnt)’.  
Before  proceeding,  the  meaning  of  “environmental  impact”  is  worth  elaborating.  By 
impact we here refer both to direct impacts do to the project (for example, loss of forest land due 
to highway, extinction of certain species) as well as pressures that contribute indirectly and over 
longer  time  scale  to  environmental  problems  (for  example,  emission  of  green  house  gases, 
depletion of natural resources). By impact we also refer to broader environmental themes such as 
acidification, not to specific substances that cause it. In the case of acidification, for example, the 
different  emissions  (e.g.  nitrogen  oxides,  sulphur  dioxide)  should  be  first  converted  to  acid 
equivalents and then summed together to get an overall measure for the acidification pressure due 
to the project. Some harmful substances may contribute to several impacts, for example, carbon 
monoxide from traffic has direct health effects in humans and it also contributes to the climate 
change in the atmosphere. 
We denote the unknown prices for the environmental impacts by p = (p1…pM). How to 
estimate these prices has been one of the key issues in environmental economics, and constitutes 
the stage 3) of the usual CBA routine. We here deviate from the conventional approaches in that 
we do not try to “parameterize” the prices based on stated or revealed preference information, but   9 
rather treat the prices as unknown model variables. Therefore, we next proceed to stage 4) and 
postpone the determination of prices p after that stage. That is, in our approach the order of stages 
3) and 4) is reversed compared to the traditional ECBA.   
Usually the economic benefits and environmental impacts vary over time. Discounting the 
costs and benefits that occur over time, to express them in net present value terms, is important 
because  most  project  have  considerable  economic  set-up  costs  while  the  benefits  and  the 
environmental impacts accumulate over a longer period. For example, a lump sum payment of 
one million dollar today is worth more than a million dollars of benefits accumulating over the 
next ten years due to the opportunity cost of the foregone interest revenue. Discounting forms the 
step 4) of the usual CBA routine. 
Denoting the discount rate by r, the net present value of the economic benefits of project n 
can be expressed as  
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Similarly, the net present value of the environmental costs of project n can be calculated as 
 
0 1









= + ∑∑ .              (2) 
If the prices of the environmental impacts (p) are constant over time (as we assume here), then we 
may first discount the impacts and make the conversion to economic costs later. Observe that we 
can write the identity (2) as 
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The sum expressed in the parentheses is the discounted total environmental impact m for project 
n.  Although  we  discount  the  physical  impacts,  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  future  are   10 
considered to be equally valuable as environmental impacts of today: we do not assume any time 
preference for the environmental impacts. The rationale for the discounting lies in the necessity to 
discount the monetary costs due to the opportunity cost of the foregone interest. As equation (3) 
shows, discounting costs or impacts yields the same net present value when the price vector p is 
constant over time. For consistency, the same discount rate r should be applied in discounting of 
both economic benefits and environmental impacts. 
  The  discounting  stage  4)  provides  us  with  the  discounted  total  environmental  impacts 
denoted by Znm (the time index t is eliminated). Similarly, we use Bn for the total (discounted) net 
present value of the net economic benefits. If Bn has a negative value, then project n does not 
make economic sense even if we disregard the environmental impacts. Such projects can be safely 
discarded at this stage. All remaining candidate projects are assumed to yield a strictly positive 
net economic benefit.  
  The net social benefit of project n (SBn) is the monetary benefit that is left after subtracting 
the cost of environmental impacts from the net economic benefits (both expressed in terms of the 
net present value). Formally, SBn can be expressed as 
1
M
n n m nm
m
SB B p Z
=
= −∑ .                 (4) 
 
In stage 5) we need to identify the project that offers the highest net social benefit. Now 
the price variables p must be determined. In the present context it is illustrative to view the DEA 
method from the game-theoretic perspective. Suppose we evaluate project k, whose proponents 
exhibit strongly opportunistic, strategic behavior. Suppose further that the project proponents can 
order a bogus valuation study where they can manipulate the price estimates  ˆ p (which may differ 
from the true prices p) to show the project k in the best possible light (e.g. by paying bribes for the 
respondents).  How  would  such  aggressively  opportunistic  project  proponents  valuate  the   11 
environmental  impacts?  What  is  the  maximum  competitive  advantage  that  the  proponents  of 
project k can demonstrate over competing projects if they could choose the prices  ˆ p at will?  
These questions are worth asking even though the may appear cynical. The answers to 
these  questions  can  guide  us  to  more  objective  policy  recommendations  in  the  sense  that 
subjective valuation of prices  ˆ p is not required. After all, if the most aggressively opportunistic 
project proponents cannot demonstrate their project to offer the social optimum, then nobody can. 
If the proponents successfully demonstrate the benefits, we can objectively identify a range of 
prices under which project k could be the socially optimal choice.  
The  problem  of  the  opportunistic  project  proponent  can  be  addressed  in  a  DEA-type 
framework. Specifically, we calculate the maximum competitive advantage of project k (CAk) that 
the proponents of this project can demonstrate over the competing projects if they can choose 
non-negative prices  ˆ p subject to the condition that project k must be socially beneficial. Formally, 
the  optimal 
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The “estimated” prices  ˆ p are the unknown variables and the net economic benefit B and the 
environmental impacts Z are known parameters of the linear programming problem (5). The first 
constraint compares in the pair-wise fashion the net benefits of project k relative to all competing 
projects. Because only one of the competing projects is chosen, the competitive advantage CA that   12 
is maximized in the objective function depends on how well project k performs relative to its best 
competitor. Thus, only the smallest value of the net benefit differences counts. To qualify as the 
socially optimal choice, the net benefit of project k must be greater than (or equal to) zero. The 
second constraint ensures that net benefit is non-negative at the estimated prices. Since the project 
that yield a negative economic net benefit (i.e., Bn <0) were already discarded after stage 4), 
problem (5) is feasible and has a finite maximum.  
The optimal solution 
*
k CA  to problem (5) can be a negative number or zero. This implies 
that there does not exist any non-negative prices  ˆ p at which project k could yield the highest 
social  net  benefit.  Whatever  prices  one  uses  for  the  environmental  impacts,  there  is  another 
project that yields a higher social net benefit. Therefore, projects with negative score in (5) can be 
discarded as “inefficient” alternatives. 
If the optimal solution 
*
k CA  is a positive number, then there does exist a vector of non-
negative prices  ˆ p at which project k proves to be socially optimal. In this case, project k is 
potentially an attractive investment project, so we diagnose it as “efficient”. The optimal solution 
*
k CA  indicates the maximum monetary net benefit that this project can offer over the second best 
candidate (prices  ˆ
∗ p  maximize this competitive advantage). If 
*
k CA  is large, then project k can 
present itself as a superior candidate at least at some prices. If 
*
k CA  is small, then project k can 
provide, even at best, only a modest advantage over the competing candidates. 
In conclusion, the competitive advantage score 
*
k CA  provides an objective benchmark that 
can be used for eliminating inefficient alternatives (
*
k CA  < 0) without assigning any a priori weights or 
prices for the environmental impacts. Among the efficient alternatives (
*
k CA  > 0), the 
*
k CA  score 
measures the maximum benefit the evaluated project can yield relative to the second best alternative.   13 
However, the CA scores are not the only information to consider in the ranking the projects. In 
general, it is more important to assess if the prices p are realistic or not. This forms the topic of 
the next section. 
 
4. Dual interpretation 
Above we noted that problem (5) resembles the usual DEA models, but presents some novel 
features. The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the similarities and differences between our 
ECBA model and the standard DEA. This section is intended for readers who are familiar with the 
conventional DEA; others may skip or browse through this section.  
Duality theory of linear programming implies that every maximization problem can be 
equivalently expressed  as a minimization problem. Hence, it is illustrative to derive the dual 










































              (6) 
where variables  i λ  represents the intensity weight assigned for project i, and  1 α ≥  is a scaling 
factor assigned for the evaluated project. One can prove that problems (5) and (6) always yield the 
same solution. 
It is illustrative to compare the dual formulation (6) with the standard envelopment side 
formulation of the output-oriented variable returns to scale DEA model (Banker et al., 1984). The   14 
similarities become apparent if we interpret the economic net benefit (B) as an output and the 
environmental impacts (Z) as inputs. Technically, problem (6) differs from the standard DEA 
formulations in two notable respects. First, the efficiency score is expressed in absolute terms as 
an additive measure, while the classic DEA models resort to relative, multiplicative measures.
6 
Second, the data of the evaluated project are multiplied by the scaling factor α , which enables 
upward scaling of the evaluated project. This scaling factor emerges as the shadow price of the 
non-negativity constraint for the NPV of the evaluated project introduced in problem (5). As far 
as the reference technology is concerned, an upward scaling of the evaluated project is equivalent 
to a downward scaling of the intensity weights  λ. Therefore, an efficient project must lie on the 
boundary of the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) reference frontier. However, the scaling 
also influences the efficiency measure. Thus, problem (6) is not a special case of the output-
oriented NIRS DEA model.  
It is also worth noting that the present ECBA formulations are technically similar to the 
eco-efficiency measures proposed by Kortelainen and Kuosmanen (2005), which also utilize a 
similar absolute scale efficiency measures. The key differences to that paper is that we here assess 
efficiency of projects in terms of the discounted NPV of economic benefits over the entire use 
life, whereas Kortelainen and Kuosmanen (2005) measure eco-efficiency of consumer durables in 
terms of economic cost per single use or performance.  
 
5. DEA as a Tool for Sensitivity Analysis 
In practice, there may exist several candidate projects that can demonstrate a positive CA score. In 
any case, all projects become unprofitable at some point when prices  ˆ p are set sufficiently high. 
                                                 
6 Of course, additive efficiency measures have been extensively used in the DEA literature before (e.g. the slack 
based Pareto-Koopmans measures and the directional distance functions), but the present interpretation of the 
efficiency index as an absolute inefficiency loss with the units of measurement (currency) is new.    15 
To make the final choice of which project –if any- will be implemented, our DEA framework 
offers a platform for a number of alternative approaches. 
The first approach is to impose domain restrictions on the admissible prices  ˆ p, as in the 
weigh-restricted DEA approaches (see e.g. Allen et al., 1997; Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 1997, for 
reviews). In problem (5) we only postulated that prices should be somewhere between zero and 
plus infinity. It is often possible to narrow down this interval to a more specific range on objective 
or  subjective  grounds.  Typically,  specifying  a  certain  range  for  the  admissible  price  is 
considerably easier than finding a specific point estimate. If the lower bound for the price of 
impact  m is Lm  and the upper bound is Um, we can simply insert in  (5) an additional linear 
constraint:  
Lm ≤  ˆm p  ≤ Um.                   (7) 
As  these  price  constraints  can  account  for  either  individuals’  or  decision  maker’s  subjective 
valuation, this approach can be called value judgement sensitivity analysis (e.g. Nash et al., 1975). 
To determine price ranges, we could, for example, use stated-preference techniques such as CVM 
to get a distribution of subjective price estimates, and restrict shadow prices to lie within a certain 
confidence interval (e.g., 95% or 99%) obtained from the subjective valuations. Alternatively, we 
could estimate lower and upper bounds by utilizing stated opinions of expert group in the same 
way as in Cherchye et al. (2006). Regardless of how price constraints have been estimated or 
determined, they can be very useful in finding the optimal project to be implemented. Note that 
when the price ranges are gradually narrowed down, at some point one of the projects will emerge 
as the only project that can show a positive CA score. 
The second approach is to directly present the decision-makers the entire range of prices at 
which a given project is the socially optimal choice. Presenting such objective price ranges would   16 
enable the decision-makers to weigh the potential competitive advantages of the projects against 
the robustness regarding the choice of prices (see Kuosmanen and Kortelainen, 2004, for more 
details).  However,  identifying  and  presenting  the  supporting  price  domains  can  become 
technically demanding especially when there are multiple environmental impacts. 
The third approach is to combine the DEA evaluation with the more traditional valuation 
techniques. We can check which of the objective price ranges the prices estimated by some other 
technique(s) fall into. In this sense, DEA can be a supportive tool for sensitivity analysis in the 
traditional valuation approaches: we can see if a small change in the estimated prices changes the 
policy recommendation. DEA could also save the costs of the traditional valuation studies. If the 
DEA  analysis  is  conducted  prior  to  the  valuation  study,  we  can  differentiate  between  those 
environmental impacts that are critically important for the decision and should be evaluated using 
ore expensive valuation techniques (such as CVM), and those impacts which are unimportant for 
the decision. 
 
6. Numerical example 
This  section  illustrates  the  application  of  the  DEA  based  CBA  by  means  of  a  hypothetical 
numerical example that relates to a household’s car investment. Although ECBA has been mainly 
used in the domain of the public sector, it applies equally well to private-sector investments (see 
e.g. Pearce, 1983). In our view, this example is a useful illustration as it pertains to a familiar 
situation and does not require much prior knowledge or expertise about the problem at hand.  
Consider an environmentally conscious four-person family living in Helsinki, Finland, 
who is planning to invest to a new sport utility vehicle (SUV). Alternatively, the family can 
continue using the public transportation and occasionally rent a car for convenience. Thus, we 
measure the benefits of the SUV by means of the opportunity cost of the transportation functions   17 
it provides.
7 For example, instead of using public transportation, one person can drive to work 
every day, which saves the monthly ticket of value €40.90 every month. Thus, this saved ticket 
price is calculated as an economic benefit of the SUV. Similarly, instead of using taxi, train and 
rental cars for going to hobbies and weekend shopping and for holiday trips, the family can drive 
in their new SUV. The expenses thus saved are counted as the benefits of the car. We  also 
explicitly accounted for the prestige value of owning a SUV. The larger vehicles look generally 
more impressive, and are considered safer than the smaller ones. Thus, we estimated the prestige 
value of a vehicle based on the car weight, using the monetary value of €7 per kg. Finally, the 
used car can be sold at second-hand market in the end of the usage period (8 years assumed).
8  
Table 1 describes the economic benefits and costs as well as the environmental impacts 
considered in the example. All benefits and costs are calculated on monthly basis, and discounted 
using the discount rate of five percent. Regarding the economic costs, the purchase prices are 
obtained from the database of the Finnish vehicle administration (AKE). The fuel expenses are 
calculated monthly based on the mileage and vehicle-specific consumption data, assuming the 
fuel prices 1.35 Euro per liter for gasoline and 1.04 Euro per liter for diesel (the prevailing price 
level in Finland at the time of analysis). Insurance fees are based on the database of If Ltd. 
(www.if.fi), a major Nordic insurance company, assuming the driver has no prior bonuses based 
on driving history. The annual vehicle taxes are the same  for all  gasoline vehicles, but vary 
according to the mass for the diesel vehicles. The mandatory annual inspection costs €55 for 
gasoline vehicles and €66 for the diesel vehicles. The annual service expenses are assumed as 
                                                 
7 For (theoretical) reasons to use opportunity costs as benefits, see e.g. Boardman et al. (2001). 
8 Owning a car can also save time compared to public transportation, which should be accounted for in the benefits. 
However, in the urban environment of Helsinki, the time spent in traffic congestion can offset the waiting time of the 
bus, metro, train, or tram. Moreover, refueling, maintenance, changing tires, and the administrative work related to 
owning a car also require considerable amount of time. Therefore, in this example the time-saving of owning a car 
has been considered to be negligible. In any case, the time-saving would bring equal benefits to all models, and thus 
would not influence the competitive advantage of any model.        18 
€200 per year for all vehicles. New tires are purchased after four years of use, and the cost of 
changing winter/summer tires every May and October is also included. Finally, a parking fee of 
€20 per month is assumed for all vehicles.  
 
Table 1: Benefits, costs, and environmental pressures 
Economic benefits        price or opportunity cost 
daily drive to work (20 km)      bus ticket, 1 person (€40.90 per month) 
weekend shopping and hobbies    taxi / car rental (€500 per month) 
holiday trips (4 per year)       train+taxi, 4 persons (€200 per quartal) 
prestige value of owning a SUV  €7 per kg of weight 
resale value of the used car (assumed to 
be 15% of the purchase price) 
(varies by model) 
   
Economic costs  Notes 
purchase price of the vehicle   varies by model 
fuel expenses   varies by model 
insurance fees  varies by model 
taxes   same for gasoline vehicles, for diesel 
vehicles varies according to the mass 
annual inspection fee   same for gasoline/diesel models 
annual service   same for all models 
tyres   same for all models 
parking €20 per month   same for all models 
   
Environmental impacts  Based on data of 
Climate change  CO2, CO  
Acidification  NOx 
Smog formation  HC 
Dispersion of particles  TPM 
Noise  measured in the speed of 50 km/h  
 
  The environmental impacts are based on the earlier study Kortelainen and Kuosmanen 
(2005),  which  included  five  different  environmental  pressure  categories:  climate  change, 
acidification, smog formation, dispersion of particles and noise. The climate change impact is 
estimated based on the carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (grams of 
CO2  equivalent),  the  acidification  impact  is  based  on  the  nitrogen  oxides  (NOx)  emissions   19 
(grams), smog formation is based on the hydrocarbons (HC) (grams), dispersion of particles is 
based on the total particulate matter (TPM) (in ppm), and the noise level is measured in the speed 
of  50  km/hour  (decibels).  We  deviate  from  Kortelainen  and  Kuosmanen  (2005)  in  that  the 
environmental impacts are here evaluated over the entire use life as total discounted net present 
impacts.  
  It is worth noting that the high fuel tax and the higher vehicle tax for diesel engine cars are 
at  least  partly  motivated  by  environmental  arguments.  To  avoid  double-counting  of  the 
environmental costs, we exclude the expenses associated with the fuel tax and the extra vehicle 
tax for diesel engine cars from the economic costs when calculating the NPV, but imposed an 
additional constraint in problem (5) that requires that the NPV of the environmental costs must be 








≥ ∑ ).      
  Our data set includes 88 different SUV models from 8 different manufacturers (Chevrolet, 
Hyundai, Jeep, Land Rover, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki and Toyota). A total of 41 models yield 
negative economic benefit at the tax free prices and are thus excluded. Of the remaining 47 
models, introducing the environmental taxes renders the NPV of 22 models negative. Thus, only 
25 models can provide a positive NPV of economic benefits, excluding the environmental costs.  
  Table 2 presents the results of the DEA model (5) for the 25 models that yield a positive 
NPV  of  the  economic  net  benefit.  Of  these  25  models  only  two  models  yield  a  positive 
comparative advantage (CA) score: Suzuki Jimny JX 4 WD 3dr and Land Rover Freelander 2.0 
Td4 E. The competitive advantage measure €809.05 for the first model indicates the maximum 
monetary benefit over the second best alternative (which is SUZUKI Jimny JX 4WD 3d ABS), 
using the most favourable prices for this model. The negative CA values indicate the minimum 
loss in NPV terms relative to the efficient alternatives. Regarding the prices, Suzuki Jimny can   20 
assign positive prices for all environmental impacts, while Land Rover Freelander assigns positive 
prices for smog and noise. As in the conventional DEA, the shadow prices for the efficient models 
need  not  be  unique.  For  the  inefficient  models,  positive  values  are  assigned  to  those 
environmental impacts in which the model performs relatively well.  
 
Table 2: Results of the DEA model 













SUZUKI Jimny JX 4WD 3d  gasoline  809.05  3.7·10-4  1.4·10-5  1.4·10-5  1.4·10-5  1.6·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 E  diesel  728.15  0  0  4.00  0  15·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 S  diesel  -728.15  0  0  4.00  0  15·10-4 
SUZUKI Jimny JX 4WD 3d ABS  gasoline  -809.05  3.7·10-4  1.4·10-5  1.4·10-5  1.4·10-5  1.6·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 
Sport hardback  diesel  -1546.19  0  0  5.88  0.76  0 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 E 
A  diesel  -2615.38  0  0  11.71  0.31  0 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 
Sport  diesel  -2840.68  0  0  3.74  0  11.4·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 
SE  diesel  -3002.49  0  0  3.74  0  11.1·10-4 
SUZUKI Jimny JLX 4WD 3d ABS  gasoline  -3236.22  3.7·10-4  1.4E-05  1.4E-05  1.4·10-5  1.6·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 S 
A  diesel  -3367.58  0  0  11.23  0.17  0 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 1.6 4WD Wide 
3d AC.  gasoline  -4471.04  0  0  0  0  31.7·10-4 
SUZUKI Jimny JLX 4WD 3d ABS 
Aut.  gasoline  -4803.16  0  0  0  0  31.1·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 1.8 E 
hardback  gasoline  -6238.65  0  0  0  17.26  0 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 1.6 4WD Wide 
3d AC Aut.  gasoline  -6537.01  0  0  0  17.26  16.1·10-4 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 2.0 4WD 5d 
AC  gasoline  -8215.60  0  0  0  17.26  12.9·10-4 
LAND ROVER Freelander 1.8 E  gasoline  -8396.13  0  0  0  17.26  0 
LAND ROVER Freelander 1.8 S  gasoline  -9124.28  0  0  0  17.26  0 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 2.0 4WD 5d 
AC Aut.  gasoline  -9220.02  2.5·10-20  0  3.64  0  0 
HYUNDAI Santa Fe2.0 CRDi VGT 
GLS 5d A/C  diesel  -11159.95  0  0  3.05  0  0 
LAND ROVER Freelander 1.8 SE  gasoline  -11398.62  0  0  0  17.26  0 
NISSAN X-TRAIL 2.0 Comfort 4x4  gasoline  -11929.73  0  0  2.82  0  0 
HYUNDAI Santa Fe2.4 GLS 5d A/C  gasoline  -12386.28  0  0  0  16.27  0 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 2.0 TDi 4WD 
5d AC  diesel  -12776.53  0  0  0  0  11.2·10-4 
SUZUKI Grand Vitara 2.5 4WD 5d 
AC  gasoline  -12912.87  0  19.34  0  0  0 
LAND ROVER Freelander 1.8 HSE  gasoline  -14622.94  0  0  0  2.3·10-5  11.7·10-4   21 
The results of Table 2 mean that the rational investment decision boils down to a choice 
between two efficient SUV models. Table 3 presents the emission data and the NPV of economic 
benefits for the two remaining models. We note that Suzuki Jimny performs better in terms of the 
green-house  gases,  NOX,  particles,  and  the  economic  benefits.  By  contrast,  Land  Rover 
Freelander is superior in HC, and somewhat better in terms of noise. Thus, the choice between the 
two top candidates critically depends on the valuation of the HC and noise, as Suzuki Jimny is 
superior in all other criteria.  
 
Table 3: Discounted emissions of the two top candidate models. 






SUZUKI Jimny JX 4WD 3d  gasoline  125·105  432  3316  360  53.0·105  16912 
LAND ROVER Freelander 2.0 Td4 E  diesel  147·105  31860  649  3099  51.9·105  4996 
 
Figure 1 presents the price regions for HC and noise at which the top candidates can yield 
the highest NPV. In this diagram we assign zero prices for CO2, NOX, and particle emissions, and 
focus on the prices that could rationalize the choice of Land Rover (compare with the profile of 
Land Rover Freelander in Table 2). The horizontal axis represents the price of noise (€/dbkm) and 
the vertical axis represents the price of HC (€/g). The Blue triangle indicates the range of prices at 
which Land Rover Freelander yields the highest NPV such that NPV is positive. The red area 
describes the similar price range for Suzuki Jimny. The white area describes the price range at 
which  no  investment  in  SUV  achieve  a  positive  NPV  and  thus  we  fall  back  to  the  public 
transportation option. This figure indicates that Suzuki Jimny is a very robust choice when the 
prices of HC and noise are relatively low. Land Rover Freelander can be rationalized only for a 
relatively small price range where the price of HC is quite high while the price of noise is low. 
Interestingly, Suzuki Jimny can bear much higher prices for noise than Land Rover Freelander,   22 
even though the latter has lower noise. This is because the economic benefits of Suzuki Jimny are 
higher. For example, at price of 0.003 €/dbkm the costs of noise are €15,894 for Suzuki Jimny and 
€15,570 for Land Rover Freelander. Subtracting this cost from the economic benefits still leaves 
Suzuki Jimny a positive value but renders Land Rover Freelander to deficit.      
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Figure 2 presents the similar price regions for climate change and acidification, assigning 
zero prices for all other environmental impacts. Suzuki Jimny is the only competitive alternative 
in  these  performance  dimensions,  so  the  purpose  of  this  diagram  is  to  illustrate  whether  the 
investment  to  this  model  is  profitable  at  all.  Figure  2  suggests  that  the  investment  can  be 
profitable  even  if  one  assigns  very  high  prices  for  the  climate  change  and  acidification.  For 
example, the spot prices for a ton of CO2 in the EU carbon pool have been less than 30 €/CO2ton, 
which stays easily within the critical limits for the SUV investment.   
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  In conclusion, the example illustrates with the real-world data how our approach helped to 
cut down the number of economically rational alternatives from 88 to 2, and identify the more 
robust of those two. The method also identified the most critical environmental impacts and the 
critical price regions, which can be useful information when complementary valuation techniques 
are implemented.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
We have presented a new approach for environmental valuation within ECBA framework that is 
based  on  data  envelopment  analysis  (DEA).  In  contrast  to  stated  preference  methods,  our 
approach does not depend on hypothetical price estimates; in our analysis the prices are neither 
estimated nor given a priori but are endogenously determined within our model, like the usual 
shadow prices in DEA. However, in contrast to traditional DEA, we measure environmental costs 
in terms of absolute rather than relative shadow prices. Although our approach does not require 
subjective  valuation,  it  is  possible  to  include  value  judgments  and  other  stated  preference 
information into model when needed. This is important property, because it enables sensitivity 
analysis and combination of the DEA evaluation with the more traditional valuation techniques.         
To illustrate the potential of this approach we also considered numerical example where an 
environmentally  conscious  household  considers  investment  to  a  new  sport  utility  vehicle. 
Although this example reveals some important advantages of our approach, a full-scale empirical 
analysis would yet confirm the reliability of the proposed model. In fact, it would be interesting to 
compare the results given by our approach to more traditional valuation methods in a full-scale 
empirical application. 
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